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Abstract. The collapse of the World Trade Center buildings on September 11, 2001
posed questions on the stability of tall buildings in ﬁre. Understanding the collapse of
the WTC Towers oﬀers the opportunity to learn useful engineering lessons in order
to improve the design of future tall buildings against ﬁre induced collapse. This paper
extends previous research on the modelling of the collapse of the WTC Towers on
September 11, 2001 using a newly developed ‘‘structures in ﬁre’’ simulation capability
in the open source software framework OpenSees. The simulations carried out are
validated by comparisons with previous work and against the ﬁndings from the NIST
investigation, albeit not in the forensic sense. The column ‘‘pull in’’ that triggers the
instability of the structure and leads to collapse is explained. The collapse mecha-
nisms of generic composite tall buildings are also examined. This is achieved through
carrying out a detailed parametric study varying the relative stiﬀness of the column
and the ﬂoors. The two main mechanisms identiﬁed in previous research (weak and
strong ﬂoor) are reproduced and criteria are established on their occurrence. The
analyses performed revealed that the collapse mechanism type depended on the bend-
ing stiﬀness ratio and the number of ﬂoors subjected to ﬁre and that the most proba-
ble type of failure is the strong ﬂoor collapse. The knowledge of these mechanisms is
of practical use if stakeholders wish to extend the tenability of a tall building struc-
ture in a major ﬁre.
Keywords: Structures in ﬁre, Progressive collapse, Tall building collapse mechanisms, WTC collapses,
Nonlinear dynamic thermo-mechanical analysis of structural frames, OpenSees
1. Introduction
The collapse of the World Trade Center buildings in a terrorist attack shocked the
world because of the sheer magnitude of life loss and the grave implications of
this event on the future of global peace and security. It also shocked structural
engineers and architects as these were the ﬁrst large modern steel frame buildings
to collapse where ﬁre could be described as the key contributing factor (impact
damage did not cause collapse). Hence questions naturally arose on the stability
of tall steel frame buildings in ﬁre which needed to be addressed in order to prop-
erly explain and understand the cause of these collapses. These questions have
assumed much greater urgency as the collapse of the WTC towers ironically coin-
cided with the beginning of a decade of a tremendous surge in the building of
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more and more super-tall buildings around the globe complemented by great
innovation in the design of the super tall structures [1]. The engineers and archi-
tects seem to have shaken oﬀ their initial shock seeking comfort in the implausi-
bility of the recurrence of a similar event and the security measures taken by the
aviation industry [2]. The role that the ﬁre had on these events, and thus the
potential impact on other super-tall buildings, has thus been relegated to a lower
level of importance [1].
Forensic investigation on the collapse of WTC towers was performed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency [3] and subsequently more comprehen-
sively by the National Institute for Standards and Technology [4]. A summary of
the structural design of the WTC complex and NIST’s ﬁndings can also be found
in the current special issue [5–8]. Other smaller scale independent research studies
were carried out by Quintiere et al. [9], Usmani et al. [10], Kodur [11], Usmani
[12] and Flint et al. [13]. The FEMA report and Quintiere et al. studied the large
deﬂections that were developed in the composite ﬂoor during the ﬁre but did not
present a clearly deﬁned collapse mechanism. Usmani et al. and the NIST report
identiﬁed that the instability that triggered the collapse was not from the aircraft
damage or connection failure but from the interactions between the ﬁre and the
structure. NIST focused on reproducing the speciﬁc sequence of events and
attempted to carry out a coupled analysis as far as possible, as advocated recently
by Baum [14]. In contrast to this, Usmani et al. concentrated on the vulnerabili-
ties of the particular structural form, not including the aircraft damage but con-
centrating on the ﬁre-structure interactions for a large range of parameterised
temperature evolutions, in terms of growth rate, magnitude and spread. In both
sets of studies a consistent global collapse mechanism where the perimeter col-
umns were pulled in was found. NIST demonstrated that this sequence of events
was in accordance with the photographic evidence.
The eﬀect of perimeter columns in the structural behaviour in ﬁre has been
investigated in the past both experimentally and computationally. Ali and O’Con-
nor [15] investigated experimentally the structural ﬁre performance of columns
under diﬀerent rotational constraints. Franssen [16] compared the eﬀect of the
interaction of a column as part of a frame and as a single element. He used the
arc length procedure in order to follow the postbuckling response of columns in
ﬁre. Huang et al. [17] examined numerically the internal forces, stresses and
strains developed in columns under axial and moment loads and a uniform tem-
perature proﬁle. Results indicated that moments become important when the col-
umns are not rotationally restrained. Shepherd and Burgess [18] also investigated
the buckling and postbuckling behaviour of columns in ﬁre including the snap
through and snap back phases. They pointed out that robustness is essential in
order for load redistribution to take place and for avoiding progressive collapse.
Previous research conducted by Quiel and Garlock [19] compared the performance
between 2D plane and 3D analysis for high rise buildings under ﬁre. Their results
indicated that a 2D plane analysis can adequately predict the interaction between
the perimeter column and the ﬂoor slab.
This study expands further the concepts that were presented by Usmani et al.
[10] based on the same assumptions. The parametric treatment of ﬁre, representing
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it as predeﬁned temperature versus time curves, is akin to a design approach and
not a forensic treatment. Therefore, this study does not address the time to failure
or any pre-existing damage and focuses on understanding the failure mechanism.
This allows the study of the particular structural form to be free from forensic
aspects [20] and with a deﬁned objective of understanding the behaviour of these
structures to derive lessons that will improve future designs. This study will also
examine further the two generic collapse mechanisms (the strong ﬂoor and the weak
ﬂoor mechanisms) for tall buildings in the event of ﬁre based on previous work by
Usmani et al. [21] in order to draw useful lessons from this major structural engi-
neering failure.
2. Model
2.1. Structural Layout
The two towers of the WTC encompassing 110 stories above ground were almost
identical. They were built using a unique structural system exploiting the tube
concept of Dr Fazlur Khan [22] to resist the immense wind loads on very tall
buildings, coupled with an ultra-light truss ﬂoor system, all optimised for rapid
construction. The details of the structural system including splices and connections
and individual member dimensions are available in the publications by FEMA [3]
and NIST [4].
The model presented in this paper is identical to the one used in Usmani et al.
[10], however a completely diﬀerent software (OpenSees, [23]) is used. A two-
dimensional sub-structure representing a 12 storey slice of the tower along the
longest span ﬂoor area is modelled, assuming the core to be rigid. More speciﬁ-
cally ﬂoors 90–101 are represented in the model. The typical dimensions of struc-
tural members included in the model are shown in Figure 1 (FEMA [3]). As
shown in the ﬁgure, the composite truss ﬂoor system is assumed to be rigidly
restrained against translation against the rigid core but is free to rotate (thus a
pinned connection was used at the right end). The column to ﬂoor connection is
also a pinned connection, constraining the translation degrees of freedom of the
ﬂoor nodes to be equal to those of the column nodes but keep rotations indepen-
dent.
The actual composite ﬂoors had a span of 60 ft (18.29 m) (in the longer span
direction) with a concrete deck thickness of 4 inches (101 mm) and a truss depth
of 29 inches (737 mm). The truss’ top and bottom chords were made from back
to back angles of an equivalent area of 1.5 9 1.5 inches (38 9 38 mm) and the
diagonals had a diameter of 1.09 inches (28 mm). The storey height was 12 ft
(3.6 m) and the columns were 350 mm square hollow sections with varying plate
thickness along the height of the column, which at the height considered here was
6 mm. The truss’ diagonals had a spacing of 40 inches (1.016 m) generally
through the span, with the end diagonals being 13.33 ft (2.032 m) long. The com-
posite ﬂoor was modelled using a span of 18 m, with diagonals spaced at 1 m and
the end diagonal was assumed to be 2 m long. The truss was assumed to have a
depth of 740 mm.
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2.2. Finite Element Modelling
2.2.1. OpenSeeS. The current ﬁnite element model (Figure 2) was constructed
using the open-source and object-oriented structural engineering software frame-
work OpenSees [19, 20]. OpenSees is eﬀectively a library of advanced computa-
tional tools for the nonlinear analysis of structures. The OpenSees framework is
being extended at the University of Edinburgh by adding classes that introduce
into OpenSees the capability of performing analyses of structures in ﬁre including
both heat transfer and thermo-mechanical analysis [25]. This work aims to enable
the analyst to perform state of the art nonlinear analysis of structures under dif-
ferent situations (ﬁre or earthquake) or multi-hazard (ﬁre after earthquake) in a
single numerical tool. The work so far includes truss and two dimensional beam
column elements with temperature dependent nonlinear uniaxial materials based
on the thermo-mechanical properties for steel and concrete published in the Euro-
codes (EN1992 and EN1993). Three-dimensional elements are also being devel-
oped and tested.
OpenSees was chosen to carry out these studies so that the results from the
newly developed code could be compared to previous research carried out with
ABAQUS and hence help validate the code developments. Once all the new devel-
opments are validated and tested on a number of diﬀerent operating systems, they
will be oﬀered to be included in a future general release of OpenSees (by PEER
and UC Berkeley) so that any interested engineer or researcher can examine and
criticise this work and use the software freely for research purposes.
2.2.2. Meshing. All the structural members (columns, slab and truss) were modelled
using the two-dimensional two-node dispBeamColumn2DThermal elements. These
elements are modiﬁed versions of the original dispBeamColumn2D elements avail-
able in OpenSees that account for ﬁre induced internal forces. DispBeamColumn2D
Figure 1. WTC towers typical structural layout.
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elements are formulated using the ﬁnite element method and adopt a distributed (or
spread of) plasticity concept which requires the user to select a number of integra-
tion points (or control sections) [26–28]. Five integration points were used for this
study. Each control section usually represents a pre determined ﬁberSection.
According to the ﬁberSection approach a cross-section is discretized (e.g., unilateral
discretization, radial discretization) into a number of ﬁbers where each ﬁber has a
prescribed uniaxial stress–strain relationship. The nonlinear geometry under large
displacements (for example, as present in beams during a ﬁre) can be incorporated
by using a co-rotational formulation which transforms the coordinates to the global
system. A suﬃcient number of these elements must be used in order to capture the
nonlinear behaviour of the members (including p-delta type eﬀects caused by
restrained thermal expansion). At least four elements were used for each truss diago-
nal, bottom chord and top chord. This allowed the model to adequately capture the
buckling of the compression diagonals and other members susceptible to buckling
under heating induced restrained thermal expansion.
A uniform load of 5 kN/m was applied to the ﬂoors. This value corresponds to
the permanent and variable loads of the structure and was taken from NIST
report [4]. Columns were subjected to a point load of 360 kN representing the
load coming from storeys above. This value was calculated taking into account
40% of the load coming from the uniform load (permanent and variable) acting
on the nine ﬂoors above this twelve storey model.
Figure 2. OpenSeeS finite element model of the WTC Tower.
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2.2.3. Composite Action. The composite slab is modelled using separate beam-
column elements for the top chord and the slab. In order to model the composite
action between the concrete slab and the top chord of the steel truss, rigidLink
constraints were used for the corresponding translations and rotation of the
nodes. rigidLink is a multi freedom constraint which ties the degrees of freedom of
a slave node to follow that of a master node. In this model the case of bond slip
is not taken into account and the slab is assumed to act in full composite action
with the top chord for the whole duration of the analysis. Therefore failure of
shear connectors cannot be modelled [29]. Shear connector failures typically begin
at the ends of the composite member and therefore may not have a signiﬁcant
global impact however this issue is not addressed in this paper.
2.3. Materials
Several ﬁre resistance tests of structural members have shown that high tempera-
ture causes material degradation so the reduction of material properties like
Young’s modulus and Yield Stress have to be accounted for by utilizing appropri-
ate constitutive relationships. Hence, new uniaxial elastic plastic material models
have been developed by modifying appropriately the existing ones under the
OpenSees framework that take into account the material degradation under ele-
vated temperatures, the steel bilinear material model (Steel01Thermal), the steel
elliptic material model (Steel02Thermal), and concrete material model (Con-
crete02Thermal).
The material properties are not exactly known and varied along the height of
the structure so typical properties were used. For the steel members (column, truss
members) a yield strength of 300 N/mm2 and modulus of elasticity of 210 GPa
were assumed. The concrete slab was assumed to have a compressive strength of
30 N/mm2 and a tensile strength of 5% of its compressive strength. The steel rein-
forcement was assumed to have yield strength of 475 N/mm2.
2.3.1. Numerical Algorithm. Quasi-static integration methods like load control
have signiﬁcant limitations in dealing with local or global instabilities that com-
monly occur in modelling structures subjected to ﬁre (because of the stresses gen-
erated by restraining thermal deformations). For this reason an implicit dynamic
procedure has been used in this work to trace post-buckling response of members
and overcome instability points. The numerical scheme selected for the dynamic
analysis is an implicit solution with a Hilber–Hughes–Taylor integrator with
a = 0.7 to add numerical damping to the model [30].
2.4. Fire Input
Due to the aircraft impact on the structure and the fuel that caused ignition on
the furniture, it can be assumed that multiple ﬂoor ﬁres were developed at the
same time in the tower [11]. For this work the ﬁre is assumed to be simultaneous
and on ﬂoors 5, 6 and 7 of the ﬁnite element model.
A generalised exponential curve is chosen to represent the time–temperature
relationship and is given by Equation (1)
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T ðtÞ ¼ T0 þ ðT maxT0Þð1 eatÞ ð1Þ
where Tmax is the maximum temperature (800C in this study), T0 is the ambient
temperature (20C), a is a rate of heating parameter (0.005) and t is the time
(3,600 s).
This ﬁre curve is very general and it is not argued that it represents the ﬁre that
was seen in the case of the WTC towers; nevertheless, the range of temperatures
covered is consistent with the ﬁre modelling conducted by NIST [4]. As this paper
is examining the collapse mechanism and not trying to reproduce the failure time,
a parametric approach to the ﬁre is reasonable.
Since the ﬁre occurs on ﬂoors 5–7 (corresponding to ﬂoors 94–96 of the tow-
ers), the members aﬀected are the composite trusses on ﬂoors 6–8 and the col-
umns supporting them. Steel sections are assumed to be heated uniformly in
contrast to concrete sections where thermal gradients appear. The columns are
assumed to be protected and hence heated to a maximum temperature of 400C
while the steel truss is assumed to be unprotected and at the same temperature
with the ﬁre, being heated to a maximum temperature of 800C. For the tempera-
ture distribution in the concrete slab, a 1D heat transfer analysis was performed.
These time temperature curves can be seen in Figure 3.
Due to the fact that the interface between the thermo-mechanical analysis part
of OpenSees and the heat transfer part is still under development, the temperature
evolution in the structural members from the ﬁre was assigned manually.
Figure 3. Temperature distribution of the structural members.
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3. Analysis and Results
3.1. Description of Global Behaviour
The global behaviour of the structure can be seen from Figure 4 showing the
deformed shape of the model. It can be seen that collapse occurs with the col-
umns being pulled inside because of the large deﬂections in the ﬂoor. The hori-
zontal displacement of the columns of the ﬁre-aﬀected ﬂoors is plotted in
Figure 5. At an early stage of the ﬁre the composite ﬂoors expand and the col-
umn is pushed outward by approximately 50 mm at about 150 s which corre-
sponds to a ﬁre temperature of 430C. After this point the column is suddenly
pulled in but stabilises and continues to displace inwards until the structure
becomes irreversibly unstable at 250 s (ﬁre temperature of 580C). It is also of
interest to note that when collapse occurs the column is almost at ambient tem-
perature. Figure 6 illustrates the vertical displacement of the columns for ﬂoors
5–9 also showing collapse at 250 s.
Horizontal reactions at the ﬂoor connection to the stiﬀ core show the change in
membrane forces over temperature. Figure 7 illustrates that the middle ﬁre ﬂoor is
in tension initially but snaps into compression before failure occurs and then goes
into tension again at the initiation of collapse. The top and bottom ﬁre ﬂoors
along with ﬂoors 4 and 10 experience compression until initiation of failure when
they snap into tension. In contrast ﬂoors 5 and 9 are in tension and snap into
compression at this point.
Figure 4. Deformed shape of the WTC Tower model.
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Figure 8 plots the section moments in the column at the ﬂoor-column joint
node. It can be seen that at around 150 s section plastic moment capacity is
reached which initiates strong ﬂoor collapse. Figure 9 shows the column plastic
rotation for ﬂoors 5, 7 and 9. The calculation of plastic rotation in OpenSees is
performed by deducting the yield or recoverable rotation by the maximum
Figure 5. Horizontal displacements of floor-column joint nodes.
Figure 6. Vertical displacement of floor-column joint nodes.
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absolute total rotation. This graph clearly shows that a plastic hinge mechanism
has been formed.
3.2. Behaviour of the Truss System
In Figure 10 the plot of midspan deﬂection of the ﬂoors versus time is shown
indicating the same pattern of behaviour as in the previous two ﬁgures. The large
Figure 7. Membrane forces in the floors.
Figure 8. Column section moments at floor-column joint nodes.
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displacements, internal forces and material degradation cause the truss diagonals
to buckle, particularly members located near the support to the stiﬀ core. These
members experience relatively larger forces arising from the restrained thermal
expansion of the ﬂoor.
The axial forces in some critical members of the top chord at the7th ﬂoor are
shown in Figure 11 where members are numbered from the left to the right (so
member 2 is near the column and member 15 is near the rigid core). The top
chord is in compression as the temperature increases until the ﬁrst instability at
150 s and remains in compression for most its length during collapse. In contrast
Figure 12 indicates that all the bottom chord members (numbered from left to
right) were in tension for the whole duration of the ﬁre until collapse but initia-
tion and ultimate collapse are still indicated by sudden changes in magnitude.
Figure 13 also displays axial forces in the inner truss diagonals (numbered from
left to right) including the right end inclined and vertical members for the 7th
ﬂoor of the model. The highest loaded compression diagonals are as expected the
outer most compression diagonals (2nd and the 27th). As in the other ﬁgures the
initiation and ultimate collapse are reﬂected in internal load redistributions in
Figure 13 as well.
4. Parametric Study on the Collapse Mechanisms
of Tall Buildings in Fire
Previous research by Usmani et al. [21] has investigated the behaviour of tall
buildings in ﬁre with similar structural form to the WTC towers but with more
Figure 9. Column plastic rotations at floor-column joint nodes.
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generic sections for columns and beams instead of tubular columns and trusses.
Their research has shown that the same collapse mechanisms are possible. Fur-
thermore, two distinctive collapse mechanisms can be identiﬁed, namely the ‘weak
ﬂoor’ and ‘strong ﬂoor’ mechanisms. The analysis presented here will reproduce
these mechanisms and establish criteria that lead to one or the other based on a
Figure 10. Midspan deflection of the floors.
Figure 11. Top Chord axial forces for the 7th floor.
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parametric study. For the analyses performed in this paper the building will be
assumed to have a ﬁxed beam-column connection at the column end. This
assumption, unlike in the WTC Towers shown previously, implies that both trans-
lation are rotation of the beam and column nodes are constrained to be the same.
But as for the WTC Towers model the possibility of connection failure is not
Figure 12. Bottom Chord axial forces for the 7th floor.
Figure 13. Axial forces in the diagonals for the 7th floor.
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taken into account. At the rigid core end the steel beam and the slab (forming the
composite ﬂoor) are both pinned to a rigid lateral restraint. This connection also
simulates a ﬁxed-end connection for the composite ﬂoor.
4.1. Weak Floor and Strong Floor Failure Mechanisms
The structural model used is similar to the one used earlier except for universal
beam and concrete slab composite ﬂoors and universal columns (instead of tubu-
lar columns and composite truss ﬂoors).
Previous research identiﬁed the two distinctive mechanisms but clear criteria
governing the collapse mechanism type were not established. These criteria are
based on the behaviour of the ‘‘bottom pivot’’ ﬂoor (the ﬂoor immediately below
the lowest ﬁre ﬂoor), which in this paper is the 5th ﬂoor. If the bottom pivot ﬂoor
reaches its plastic moment capacity at midspan (from P–d moments induced
because of having to provide a reaction to the ‘‘pull in’’ forces at the ﬁre ﬂoors,
see Figure 14a), a hinge is formed (see Figure 14a) in the ﬂoor and the weak ﬂoor
mechanism is initiated. The bending failure spreads to the lower adjacent ﬂoor
and then further downwards (with potentially a similar failure spreading upwards
from the top pivot ﬂoor) leading to a progressive disproportionate collapse of the
structure. If the bottom pivot ﬂoor is able to sustain the increasing bending
moments, the column connecting the pivot ﬂoor may reach its plastic moment
capacity ﬁrst (as indicated by the hinge shown in Figure 14b) at a section near the
ﬂoor-column connection which then initiates the strong ﬂoor failure. A three
hinge mechanism forms with two further hinges in upper ﬂoors. The key distinc-
tion between the two collapse mechanisms is the initiation. In the weak ﬂoor
mechanism collapse initiates due to bending failure of the bottom pivot ﬂoor
itself, while in the strong ﬂoor mechanism collapse initiates due to combined com-
pression and bending failure of the column adjacent to the bottom pivot ﬂoor.
Figure 14 shows deformed shapes for weak and strong ﬂoor collapse under a
three ﬂoor ﬁre scenario (ﬁre aﬀected ﬂoors are ﬂoors 6–8).
4.1.1. Strong Floor Collapse. Figure 14 illustrates the two mechanisms as descri-
bed above for a three ﬂoor ﬁre in a model of a typical tall steel frame composite
structure as described above. Figure 15 shows the horizontal displacements of the
column at the level of the ﬁre ﬂoors (with negative direction denoting outward
movement and positive denoting inward movement). Figure 16 shows the midspan
deﬂections at the ﬁre ﬂoors and Figure 17 the horizontal reaction force at the
rigid end restraints at the right. These reactions represent the membrane forces in
the ﬂoors. It can be seen that initially the bottom and top ﬁre ﬂoors and ﬂoors 4
and 10 are in compression (negative sign) and then snap into tension (positive
sign) when failure initiates. On the other hand, the pivot ﬂoors, 5 and 9 are in
tension and when failure begins they snap into compression. Floor 7 is in tension
when the ﬂoors are expanding but then goes into compression when the pull in
process starts and ﬁnally goes into tension again when failure occurs. Figure 18
shows the moments in the column at the level of the ﬁre and pivot ﬂoors.
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The ﬁgure clearly shows the changes in column moments during outward displace-
ment and the reversal of signs at the beginning of collapse as expected.
4.1.2. Weak Floor Collapse. Weak ﬂoor collapse, if possible, will occur at an ear-
lier time for the same column than the strong ﬂoor collapse. This is initiated at
the bottom pivot ﬂoor if it cannot sustain the additional moment demand from
the P-d moments induced by the ‘‘pull in’’ forces at the ﬁre ﬂoors. Furthermore,
weak ﬂoors expand much less than strong ﬂoors before the ‘‘pull in’’ phase starts
(as shown in Figure 19). Figure 20 shows the vertical displacements of the column
at the level of the ﬁre ﬂoors, clearly indicating collapse.
Figure 21 clearly shows that the bottom and top pivot ﬂoors suddenly experi-
ence signiﬁcant deﬂections after the ﬁre ﬂoor deﬂections reach between 700 mm
and 800 mm, which is indicative of bending failure in the pivot ﬂoors.
It can be seen in Figure 21 that the 5th ﬂoor (or the bottom pivot ﬂoor) of the
structure also deﬂects when the collapse occurs. This indicates bending failure of
the bottom pivot ﬂoor which does not occur in strong ﬂoor collapse and hence is
a main distinguishing characteristic of weak ﬂoor collapse.
Figure 22 shows the variation of membrane forces at the connection of the ﬂoors
to the stiﬀ core. Here the behaviour is similar to the strong ﬂoor
mechanism. It can be seen that initially ﬂoors 4, 6, 8 and 10 are in compression and
Figure 14. Deformed shapes of weak floor and strong floor failures.
The World Trade Center 9/11
later snap into tension while ﬂoors 5, 7 and 9 are initially in tension and then snap
into compression. Figure 23 plots the variation of moments in the column. Similar
changes occur during the pulling-in process like for the strong ﬂoor collapse.
Figure 15. Horizontal displacement for the strong floor failure.
Figure 16. Midspan deflection for the strong floor failure.
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4.2. The Eﬀect of Bending Stiﬀness of the Structural Members
and Number of Floors in Fire
The analyses performed previously have identiﬁed that both types of collapse
mechanisms are in bending, either in the ﬂoors or in the column. It could there-
fore be illuminating to examine the eﬀect of diﬀerent ﬂoor and column bending
Figure 17. Horizontal reaction for the strong floor failure.
Figure 18. Column moments for the strong floor failure.
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stiﬀness combinations. It is also clear that the number of ﬂoors on ﬁre will also be
a signiﬁcant factor in what type of failure mechanism occurs. When a greater
number of ﬂoors are subjected to ﬁre, the bottom pivot ﬂoor will need to carry
greater moments because of the larger forces required to anchor the sagging ﬁre
ﬂoors in tensile membrane action.
Figure 19. Horizontal displacement for the weak floor failure.
Figure 20. Vertical displacement for the weak floor failure.
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In order to investigate the eﬀect of the ratio of bending stiﬀness between the
column and ﬂoors, a number of analyses were performed keeping constant the
height of the column (4 m), the length of the ﬂoor (10 m) and the concrete slab
depth (100 mm) and its width (6 m) but varying the steel sections.
Figure 21. Midspan deflection for the weak floor failure.
Figure 22. Horizontal reaction for the weak floor failure.
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The ratio is deﬁned as,
Scolumn
Sfloor
¼ ðECIC=LCÞðEF IF =LF Þ
These quantities are calculated using the transformed area method for the ﬂoors
as they are composite members. A wide range of diﬀerent scenarios were consid-
ered for this paper. An indicative illustration is shown in Table 1.
Figure 24 shows deformed shapes for weak and strong ﬂoor collapse under a
four ﬂoor ﬁre scenario (ﬁre ﬂoors are 6–9) and Figure 25 shows deformed shapes
for weak and strong ﬂoor collapse under a ﬁve ﬂoor ﬁre scenario (ﬁre ﬂoors are
6–10). These ﬁgures also denote where the ﬁrst plastic hinge is formed in the pivot
ﬂoor or in the pivot ﬂoor-column joint node for the weak ﬂoor and strong ﬂoor
collapses. The 5th ﬂoor is always the bottom pivot ﬂoor in this paper.
The analyses performed revealed that the collapse mechanism type depended on
the bending stiﬀness ratio and the number of ﬂoors subjected to ﬁre, as illustrated
in Figure 26. The hatched area in the ﬁgure shows a fuzzy region where either
type of failure can occur. This sort of a diagram would allow a very quick check
to determine what sort of failure could be expected for a particular building under
multiple ﬂoor ﬁres keeping in mind that the possibility of failure of connections or
shear connectors is not taken into account. This is useful information in case a
weak ﬂoor collapse is indicated. Strengthening of the ﬂoors and conversion to a
strong ﬂoor collapse would considerably extend the tenability of the structure and
hence the time available for egress and intervention. In earthquake engineering
strong columns and weak beams are preferred which seems to contradict the rec-
ommendation given here. This however is non-issue, because for strong ﬂoor col-
lapse in ﬁre, the higher stiﬀness of the ﬂoor is required at midspan (where a hinge
Figure 23. Column moments for the weak floor failure.
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should be avoided). In earthquake engineering the relevant ﬂoor stiﬀness relative
to the column is that at the ends where a hinge may be allowed to be formed
instead of in the column to ensure ductile behaviour.
Table 1
Collapse Types for Different Scenarios
UB 533 9 210 9 92 406 9 178 9 74 356 9 171 9 51 305 9 165 9 46 305 9 127 9 37
UC 3 Floor ﬁre
356 9 406 9 235 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
356 9 368 9 153 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
305 9 305 9 158 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
UC 4 ﬂoor ﬁre
356 9 406 9 235 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
356 9 368 9 153 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
305 9 305 9 158 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
UC 5 ﬂoor ﬁre
356 9 406 9 235 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
356 9 368 9 153 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
305 9 305 9 158 Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Strong ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor Weak ﬂoor
Figure 24. Deformed shapes for a four floor fire (6–9).
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The results of the parametric studies performed illustrate that the most proba-
ble type of failure is the strong ﬂoor collapse. The weak ﬂoor collapse has been
seen to occur under certain cases too. For the three and four ﬂoors ﬁre scenarios
the weak ﬂoor failure occurred for beams that were outside the serviceability limit
state criterion (span/300), but for the ﬁve ﬂoor scenario the serviceability limit
state was satisﬁed. However, it should be noted that for the three and four ﬁre
ﬂoor scenarios, the possibility of weak ﬂoor collapse should be checked as vari-
able bending stiﬀness or length along the ﬂoors or imperfections could produce
diﬀerent results. More research is required to investigate these mechanisms on
other structural forms especially very long span ﬂoors made using trusses or cellu-
lar beams.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper has examined the response of the WTC tow-
ers in ﬁre and explored various collapse scenarios indicated from previous work.
The column ‘‘pull in’’ that triggers the instability of the structure and leads to col-
lapse has been explained. The global behaviour of the structure as well as the
local behaviour of the truss has been examined.
Figure 25. Deformed shapes for a five floor fire (6–10).
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In order to understand tall building collapse in ﬁre, a simpler and more typical
steel frame composite structure was modelled. The two diﬀerent types of collapse
mechanisms, weak ﬂoor and strong ﬂoor failure, have been conﬁrmed and clear
distinctions have been drawn in terms their initiation at speciﬁc locations in the
structure.
Parametric studies were performed in order to evaluate the conditions at which
one or the other type of collapse occurs. This has led to a very practical design
and assessment criterion of column-ﬂoor stiﬀness ratio against the number of
ﬂoors on ﬁre. The results of these studies have also shown that the most common
type of collapse mechanism is the strong ﬂoor collapse, however weak ﬂoor col-
lapse becomes more likely with more ﬂoors on ﬁre. The knowledge of these mech-
anisms is of practical use if stakeholders wish to extend the tenability of a tall
building structure in a major ﬁre.
Finally, this work also showed the capability of OpenSees to perform progres-
sive collapse analysis under ﬁre since the same global collapse mechanisms seen in
previous work [10, 13, 21] have been reproduced without any signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence. A primary reason for OpenSees being advantageous for this parametric
study compared to ABAQUS is that it is more computationally eﬃcient. Its com-
putational eﬃciency arises primary from its well-written object-oriented architec-
ture and relatively low overhead compared to commercial codes. It would
however be easy to perform the same kind of analysis with commercial codes as
well. Diﬀerences were only seen in failure times after the pulling-in process was
Figure 26. Collapse type envelope for different ratios.
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initiated for the generic tall buildings but these resulted from the time scaling that
was used in previous research (from 3,600 s to 3.6 s) that underestimated the
dynamic eﬀects [21].
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